Background: This academic essay was written in early 2019. In it, I aimed to explore the rise of ‘Islamism’ in the Middle East, an ideology emerging from Islam that claims to represent the political wing of the faith . In light of recent tensions between the United States and Iran after the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, I thought now would be an appropriate time to post this essay. Today, Iran is the only internationally recognized state to have adopted ‘Islamic rule’ and ‘shariah law’ as its official mode of government.
Despite this, the ideological convictions driving Iran have not been articulated effectively in the international press, and as a result are not well understood by the public. Hopefully this essay will go some way in bridging this gap of understanding. Whilst the focus here is not on Iran per se, the proliferation of Islamism in that country and across the Muslim World is a development that continues to have a huge impact on efforts at diplomacy in the region. It therefore needs to be understood before an effective solution can be offered.
Introduction
The major new challenges to international stability, social progress and human rights in the post-Cold War era have emerged not from hostile relations between nation-states, or from competition amongst global superpowers, but rather from the decentralized activities of radical intra-state groups. A chief culprit of this has been Islamism, an ideological movement which has gained significant influence in many Muslim societies by promoting its vision of a ‘politicized Islam’. Radical supporters of this ideology have been associated with widespread social instability across the world, with civilian populations in numerous countries being the target of political violence and acts of terror.
This is not the case for all of Islamism`s supporters, however, with a range of peaceful and political methods also being employed. This is a fact often overlooked in public discourse on this topic, a common oversight which this essay seeks to address. The dangers of Islamism run far deeper than the brutal practices of its militant wing, with the end goal of the movement being distinctly illiberal and regressive in nature. This makes the broad popularity of Islamism in the Muslim World a pressing concern and means an accurate understanding of the Islamist worldview will be vital.
In analyzing this phenomenon, I will avoid many of the pitfalls existing in current scholarship on this topic. For instance, many scholars have promoted narrow portrayals of what Islamism is, asserting either that it is solely a religious movement without any political component, or that it is purely political in scope. Both of these approaches are flawed, due to them failing to perceive that a “constellation of forces” (Woltering, 2010: 1138) are responsible for the ideology’s emergence. I contend that there is a need to explore all the factors which have contributed to this phenomenon, be they theological, historical, political, philosophical etc. It is only through such a broad analysis that the means to effectively address Islamism can be found.
It is also necessary to clarify some of key terms that will be used in constructing my argument. This is especially important given the sensitive nature of the topic, as this is a debate where the misuse of labels can have a profound impact on relations between Muslims and non-Muslims.
Firstly, ‘Islamism’ will be defined here as a political and religious ideology which seeks to “impose any given interpretation of Islam over society as law” (Nawaz, 2012: 79), thus instituting ‘Islamic rule’. The term is therefore a byword for contemporary ‘political Islam’, a meaning it has acquired relatively recently, with it initially denoting the religion of Islam as a whole (Mozaffari, 2007: 18). This definition is adopted due to it recognizing that the ideology has both religious and political roots. It is also important to illustrate the different forms that ‘Islamic rule’ can take. These can be roughly divided into two types: ‘National Islamism’, which seeks to establish an ‘Islamic State’ in the context of the nation-state, and ‘Global Islamism’, which seeks a worldwide Islamic order as a replacement to the current international system. This latter type is associated with notions of ‘Pax Islamica’, the global peace that will ensue once all the world is united under Islamic rule (Tibi, 2012: 146). However, it is important to recognize that many Islamists subscribe to both of these aspirations, with the national ‘Islamic State’ often being perceived as a precursor to the spread of this model worldwide.
There are also distinctions to be made between different types of Islamist activity. For instance, ‘Political Islamists’ seek their goal through methods such as political activism, lobbying of governments, and even standing for elections in some cases. Examples of this type of Islamist group are the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and the international Hizb ut-Tahrir. Such groups work to change the political system from the inside and can be distinguished from Islamists who aim enact change from the outside (Harris and Nawaz, 2015: 19). Two groups fit into this latter category: ‘Revolutionary Islamists’, who work for a sweeping social uprising which will completely establish Islamic rule, and ‘Militant Islamists’, who pursue this cause through violent means (Harris and Nawaz, 2015: 20). Members of this group will be labeled as ‘jihadists’, owing to their interpretation of the Islamic concept of ‘jihad’, or ‘holy war’, being distinctly radical. The most well-known examples of such groups are ISIS and Al-Qaeda.
This essay will also use the terms ‘the West’ and the ‘Muslim World’, as originally outlined by Samuel Huntington. These terms do not denote homogeneous social blocs, but rather dynamic arrays of institutions and values which have merged, divided and changed over time (Huntington, 1996: 44). While more precise definitions on this topic would be ideal, in discussing Islamism in the context of religion, culture and history, such general terms may be necessary. My use of ‘the West’ refers to those nations where ‘Western civilization’ predominates and is associated with a loose set of institutions including social liberalism, secularism and democracy. These form a political model called ‘liberal democracy’ which is typical across Western civilization, though is not universal. My use of the ‘Muslim World’ is used here as a shorthand term for Samuel Huntington`s description of ‘Islamic Civilization’, existing in those countries in the world where Islam is the majority religion. This definition therefore doesn’t include Muslim minorities in other countries, which collectively constitute the ‘Islamic diaspora’.
Finally, the term ‘Conservative Muslims’ will refer here to those Muslims in the Muslim World who hold regressive, illiberal or anti-progressive beliefs, yet are not inherently political. This group is associated with the ‘piety movement’ within the Islamic Revival, a cultural and apolitical movement.
Using these terms as a foundation, this essay will progress through three main stages: Chapter One will start by outlining the Islamic Revival, the cultural movement in which Islamism is nested, which has involved widespread attempts to ‘re-Islamize’ society. This chapter will provide a historical and theoretical framework from which an analysis of Islamism can proceed. It will also outline an original approach as to how this analysis should be undertaken, which will be labelled as ‘cautious optimism’. Chapter Two will then unpack the Islamist worldview, exploring the works of some of the ideology’s key proponents, and investigating both its political and religious roots. This will provide an accurate account of the challenge posed by Islamism, laying the groundwork for an informed response to it. Finally, Chapter Three will explore possibilities for such a response, engaging with the works of reformist Muslims who are seeking to enact an ‘Islamic Reformation’. This chapter will also identify the role that can be played by many Western societies in this process, by providing a ‘safe haven’ in which reformist Muslims can operate. This chapter aims to realize a ‘cautiously optimistic’ approach towards the problem of Islamism, exploring possibilities for change whilst remaining cognizant of the realities that must be faced.
It will be concluded that Islamism represents a complex and multifaceted challenge to social progress, international stability and human rights in the modern era, and so Western nations should seek to facilitate peaceful reform in Muslim societies. A significant cultural shift within Islamic civilization may also be needed, which would constitute an ‘Islamic Reformation’. This shift would accentuate the more progressive aspects of the faith, at the expense of its more regressive elements.
Chapter One: Islam and the West in Modern History
This chapter will explore the consequences of the Islamic Revival, the cultural movement which has given rise to the ideology of Islamism, on the relationship between Islamic and the Western civilization in the modern world. This will involve outlining key trends in the political thought of both civilizations, with particular focus on how the Revival has challenged many prevailing assumptions of liberal thought. Two theoretical approaches will also be introduced to aid in conceptualizing this phenomenon, drawn from both the realist and liberal schools of international relations. The first will be Samuel Huntington`s theory of the ‘Clash of Civilizations’, and the other will be Francis Fukyama’s ‘The End of History’ thesis. These works represent radically different visions of global politics and offer different conclusions as to the nature of the Islamic Revival and political Islam. The chapter will conclude that neither of these worldviews offer an effective approach towards the problems posed by Islamism. Therefore, there is a need to navigate a middle-way between them, drawing ideas from both theories in order to construct a ‘cautiously optimistic’ worldview. This approach would seek pragmatic responses to global conflicts whilst avoiding both fatalistic and Utopian thinking.
The Revival of Islam
In exploring the rise of political Islam, we must first place it within the context of the ‘Islamic Revival’, a cultural movement which has swept the Muslim World since the 1970s. This movement has been characterized by the widespread ‘Islamization’ of many Muslim majority countries, with an emphasis on re-instating Islamic values, law, language and education in these societies (Huntington, 1996: 110). Some have identified this as a broad counter-movement against the secularism and ‘Westernization’ of many current regimes (Mahmood, 2012: 4), whilst others claim it to be a direct response to the challenges of modernity, with multiple forces of social change leading to a desire to “reaffirm the fundamentals” (Lapidus, 1997: 455) of Islam. It is from this foundation that the Islamist ideology has emerged, however the Revival is not exclusively political in reach. It is therefore possible to identify two key faces of this movement: one ‘private and cultural’, centered in civil society only, and one ‘public and political’, focused on the revolutionary transformation of the political system. Both of these dimensions pose independent challenges to social progress, as well as challenging many of the core values and assumptions embedded in liberal thought.
One of these challenges relates to the case of women within many Muslim societies, an issue which has been discussed by Saba Mahmood. Mahmood labels the cultural dimension of the Islamic Revival as the ‘piety movement’, a conservative project which aims at the resurrection of religious tradition through the reversal of modern social trends, and the curtailing of certain individual freedoms (Mahmood, 2012: 4). The piety movement is therefore illiberal and anti-progressive in nature, challenging many values and assumptions within liberal thought. An example of this is the case of women’s rights. Mahmood questions why this project, which advocates for the subjugation of women in a number of ways, has nonetheless succeeded in garnering support amongst many Muslim women (Mahmood, 2012: 5). This fact directly contradicts a key liberal assumption: that all human beings innately desire freedom and will always seek it when given the opportunity. This idea has often been related to the struggle between religious fundamentalism and liberalism, with Enlightenment thinkers like Voltaire and Baron de Montesquieu seeking to secularize politics and challenge religious orthodoxy, thus removing theocratic barriers to personal freedom (Kessler, 1983: 381).
This was effectively illustrated in Montesquieu`s Persian Letters, whereby the philosopher set out a fictional story critiquing the treatment of women within the biblical tradition (Kessler, 1983: 383). The story depicted the jealous and tyrannical Ibrahim (the Islamic name for Abraham) keeping twelve women in subordination in his own personal harem, mirroring the twelve disciples of Jesus Christ (Kessler, 1983: 386). One of the women, Anais, challenges his rule and is killed by her master. She ascends to heaven, where she discovers a paradise full of sensual pleasures, with angelic men existing to fulfill her every desire (Montesquieu, 1721: 189). The philosophically-minded Anais then sends to Earth one of her heavenly servants, who takes the place of Ibrahim. This ‘New Ibrahim’ liberates the women, establishing a paradise on Earth which mirrors the heaven above (Montesquieu, 1721: 193). This story is a powerful expression of the liberal attitude towards religious conservatism, depicting a human nature which yearns to be free from the yolk of earthly tyranny. This view of human nature therefore embodies the notion that an innate ‘will to freedom’ exists in every human being.
A Challenge to Liberal Thought
Through this story, Montesquieu aimed at a reformation of the biblical tradition, introducing into it the values of freedom, tolerance and sexual liberation (Kessler, 1983: 393). This narrative has proven deeply influential in many areas of Western thought, acting as a powerful counter-narrative against Christian conservatism historically. It has proven far less effective in Islamic civilization however, with the piety movement embodying a widespread rebellion against such a liberal worldview. The fact that many Muslim women support the movement also represents a significant challenge for liberals, as it suggests that human beings are capable of actively campaigning for their own subjugation. This weakens many areas of liberal thought, such as Francis Fukuyama`s ‘end of history’ thesis, whereby he argued that all of human history has been a shared, universal march towards liberal democracy (Fukuyama, 1992: 48). For Fukuyama, the triumph of the liberal democratic political model after the Cold War represented an end of history moment, whereby liberal democracy had become the sole surviving ideological candidate for mass appeal and ‘universality’ (Fukuyama, 1992: 42). He grounded this upon the same notion of the will to freedom that was espoused by Montesquieu, which he believed constitutes “the nature of man as man” (Fukuyama, 1992: 51). Fukuyama rejected the threat posed by the Islamic Revival on this basis, contending that this worldview has only succeeded in Muslim majority countries, thus lacking appeal for non-Muslims.
However, this response fails to contend with the possibility that the Islamic Revival has revealed the flaws in the liberal view of human nature. As urbanization, social mobilization, higher literacy and exposure to other cultures has increased across Muslim societies (Huntington, 1996: 116), many liberals would assume that the innate will to freedom should begin to manifest itself. However, despite unprecedented opportunities to campaign for civic freedoms now being available, many Muslims have turned to a movement which actively seeks the suppression of numerous individual rights. As a direct inversion of Montesquieu’s narrative, many now yearn for a social order more akin to the reign of the original Ibrahim than his liberal replacement. Another challenge to the liberal worldview emerges from the Islamic Revival`s political face: Islamism. The goal of this ideology, to institute the political model of the ‘Islamic State’, seems to contradict Fukuyama`s notion that human history is inevitably shifting towards liberal democracy. It is possible that the historical process leading to democracy is not yet complete however, and that the rise of Islamism is merely a temporary obstacle towards its full proliferation. Only history will tell if this is the case. However, the Islamic Revival provides ample reason to be skeptical of this thesis.
The fact that the Islamic Revival represents a significant challenge to the liberal worldview therefore could necessitate adopting a more pessimistic approach. This can be drawn from a work by political scientist Samuel Huntington, entitled ‘The Clash of Civilizations’. This book has become hugely influential in many circles, offering a powerful realist rebuttal to Fukuyama`s theory. Its central thesis is that the world can be understood as a plurality of transnational ‘civilizations’, each having their own distinct histories, cultures and politics, constituting the “highest cultural grouping” (Huntington, 1996: 43). This means that no other forms of human association can exist above them. They are the broadest and most long-lasting type of social bond, defined by blood, language, way of life, and most importantly, religion (Huntington, 1996: 42). The role of religion as the foundation-stone for these cultures is illustrated in Huntington`s account of the contemporary civilizations still in existence. Of the five major world religions identified by Max Weber, four form the basis of a civilization: Christianity (‘the West’), Islam (‘the Muslim World’), Hinduism (‘the Subcontinent’), and Confucianism (‘Sinic/Chinese civilization’) (Huntington, 1996: 45-47). It is through this framework that Huntington presents a pessimistic picture of global politics, whereby conflict between cultures/religions are deemed inevitable.
This has clear implications for conceptualizing the Islamic Revival, offering a fatalistic account of the movement as merely the most recent manifestation of an ancient war between Islam and the West. Huntington contends that this conflict is inevitable due to the nature of the two cultures being fundamentally distinct. The two represent the “other`s Other” (Huntington, 1996: 210), the designated ‘outside’ against which civilizations organize themselves. Just as Simone de Beauvoir recognized the ‘Other-Self’ dichotomy as a fundamental category of human thought (Beauvoir, 1949: 17), similar oppositions pervade global politics. According to Huntington`s worldview, while Islamism may one day be vanquished, it would likely soon be replaced by a surrogate movement that is equally hostile to the West. This framework therefore offers a worldview which directly counters the optimism of many liberals.
Advocating for a Balanced Approach
These theses therefore represent two conflicting worldviews: one optimistic, with the other deeply pessimistic. Both of these positions offer useful theoretical tools in conceptualizing the ideology of Islamism, yet they are not without their flaws. It is therefore necessary to navigate a middle way between these worldviews. I propose an approach which will be labelled here as ‘cautious optimism’, which seeks to identify the range of challenges and problems associated with the ideology of Islamism, whilst seeking ways to effectively address it. This approach also avoids the pitfalls of both of these worldviews. For instance, Huntington`s notion of the inevitability of conflict between civilizations can be deemed too fatalistic. While substantive differences certainly exist between cultures, this does not always form the basis of conflict, and periods of hostility in history have often given way to periods of peace and co-operation. While Huntington acknowledges this, his argument that such periods merely represent a Cold War scenario between civilizations (Huntington, 1996: 121) may be too bleak, and could prove a counterproductive notion when attempting to negotiate an enduring peace.
Similarly, my approach avoids the utopianism of liberal thinkers like Fukuyama, by accepting that liberal democracy is not an inevitability, and that human nature is not reducible to a will to freedom. While a yearning for liberty may be a part of the human race, this urge is often overridden by other concerns and values. To believe that a people would not choose to accept a tyranny, even when presented with a freer alternative, may therefore by a liberal assumption that must be abandoned.
The balance that must be struck is thus between the idealism of Montesquieu and Fukuyama and the stern realism of Huntington. I contend that the efforts of scholarship on this topic should be focused on finding pragmatic responses to the problem of Islamism, without lapsing into either Utopian or fatalistic thinking. This will involve investigating the root causes of the ideology, be they religious, cultural, political, historical etc. From this, I will sketch an accurate account of the Islamist worldview, and engage in a critical deconstruction of it. This unpacking of both its political and theological dimensions will have direct consequences for how the ideology should be responded to by its opponents, both in the West and within the Muslim World.
Chapter Two: Unpacking the Islamist Worldview
This chapter seek to unpack the ideological worldview associated with Islamism and identify the major factors which have driven the movement. This will be done firstly by exploring the ideas of Islamist thinkers such as Sayyid Qutb, Hasan al‐Bannā and Sayyid Abul A`la Mawdudi, three major progenitors of the ideology’s development. The influence that Islamism has exerted in Muslim societies will then be discussed, unpacking how its proponents have succeeded in constructing a monopoly over public discourse in the Muslim World. This will lead into an analysis of both the religious and political aspects of the ideology. How these two dimensions intersect will also be explored, with the chapter concluding that Islamism is not exclusively political or religious in nature. Rather, it embodies a combination of ideas, both political and theological, which form a specific and narrow interpretation of the faith. It will be concluded that Islamic ideas cannot be fully exonerated from blame in relation to the emergence of Islamism, yet nor can they be treated as its sole cause.
Key Islamist Thinkers
In seeking to unpack the Islamist worldview, it is necessary to engage with some of the major proponents of the ideology. While political Islam has manifested itself at multiple times throughout Islamic history, ‘Islamism’ as it currently exists originated in 1928 with the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Hasan al‐Bannā, the founder of this Sunni Islamist body, based his organization on the notion that Islam represents a comprehensive system for all aspects of life (Soage, 2009a: 295), rejecting the idea that Islamic values are merely a matter of private faith. He instead argued that Islam offers a complete manual for how human beings should structure their societies, with prescriptions for law, morality, family, sex, the state etc. This new totalizing interpretation became the inspiration for much subsequent Islamist thought, such as the works of Sayyid Qutb. Indeed, it was Qutb who built upon these ideas of al‐Bannā, systematizing his interpretation into a coherent political model (Soage, 2009b: 199). The major point of convergence for these two thinkers was that the relegation of the faith to the private sphere has led to a “colonized, submissive and servile” (Soage, 2009a: 298) Islam, and that secular institutions of government embody nothing more than foreign impositions. They believed that the only way to rediscover the strength of Islam, therefore, would be through the creation of an ‘Islamic State’, which would marry modern political structures with traditional religious values.
The Islamist movement may therefore be read as a rebellion against secularism, which seeks to replace the modern state with a new form of authoritarian theocracy. However, Islamism`s rebellion runs deeper than mere concerns around particular political models. This can be seen in the works of Sayyid Qutb, a chief ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood, who expanded the scope of this rebellion by opposing all forms of modern materialist philosophies (Soage, 2009b: 190). Qutb included both communism and capitalism into this camp, believing them to be products of the same materialist culture. He argued that such man-made philosophies were destined to be inferior to the God-given doctrines of Islam, which constitute a comprehensive metaphysical system offering mankind a “complete cure for all of its problems” (Qutb, 1953: 114). The Islamic State, as a realization of this metaphysical system on Earth, thus became Qutb`s own ‘balm of Gilead’, or a ‘universal cure’ for all the ills of the world. This political model would institute absolute justice in human life, which would be earned and maintained through the absolute reverence of God (Qutb, 1953: 129). This belief is perfectly encapsulated in a slogan of the Muslim Brotherhood: “Islam is the solution” (Stilt, 2010: 79), a famous mantra which has succeeded in drawing many young Muslims into the Utopian narrative of Qutb.
This conviction in the potential universal appeal of Islamic values and ideas shares some parallels with Francis Fukuyama`s belief in the ‘universality’ of liberal democracy as a political model. However, the Islamist conception is more totalizing in many aspects. Whilst Fukuyama grounded his faith in liberal democracy on the notion of the innate will to freedom, Islamists take such assertions of ‘naturalness’ even further. This is exemplified by Sayyid Abul A`la Mawdudi, another Islamist thinker of the 20th century, who believed that the universe is an orderly and law-governed system which follows a pre-ordained grand scheme (A`la Mawdudi, 1932: 2). He contended that everything in the universe is Muslim, and all obeys the design set by God. Whilst for Fukuyama the eventual acceptance of liberal democracy would result from an expression of a ‘true’ human nature, a similar notion is taken further by Mawdudi, who believed that the Islamic State would result from nothing less than the immutable laws of God. It is thus not only man`s innate nature that necessitates the creation of an Islamic State, but also the nature of the cosmos itself.
This totalizing metaphysical perspective in Islamist thought is accompanied also by the totalizing model of the Islamic State. The extent to which this system would control its subjects, both in their thoughts and actions, may even justify using the label “totalitarian ideology” to describe Islamism (Choueiri, 2010: 88). Indeed, this has been advocated for by Mehdi Mozaffari, a political scientist and Iranian exile who has compared the rise of Islamism to the major totalitarian movements of the 20th century. He contended that this new phenomenon has been driven by similar factors to those which led to the emergence of fascism and communism across Europe. The core of these factors was the collapse of the major world empires after the First World War, and the resulting uncertainties this caused in the populations left behind (Mozaffari, 2009: 1). Mozaffari says that the fall of the Ottoman Empire, considered by many as the last Islamic ‘Caliphate’, led to widespread disenchantment across the Muslim World, with an identity crisis ensuing amongst those for whom the Empire had been a focal point of their identity (Mozaffari, 2009: 2). The discontent this caused laid the foundations for Islamism`s mass appeal, due to it promising the restoration of unity and order in a world where many Muslims no longer felt their civilization had a home.
Mozaffari also linked this post-war sense of rootlessness to the emergence of ‘Pan-Movements’, originally discussed by Hannah Arendt, whereby an “enlarged tribal consciousness” (Arendt, 1951: 232) comes to drive a political project. In such movements, ‘home’ is identified as anywhere that members of the tribe live, and notions of ‘Pan-Slavic’, ‘Pan-Germanic’, or indeed ‘Pan-Islamic’ identities proliferate. Such conceptions involve an assertion of social unity, whereby spokespeople claim the right to speak for all members of their global tribe. This was true of Sayyid Qutb when he proclaimed that Islam is a “homogeneous unity” (Qutb, 1953: 116), with clear cultural boundaries and a political project shared by all ‘true’ Muslims. Such assertions of homogeneity are part of what characterizes totalitarian ideology for Arendt. She argued that this process of eliminating plurality aims to create a social collective, whereby all distinctions between individual members are eradicated (Arendt, 1951: 478). Such movements are rarely as homogeneous as they claim, however. Indeed, Islamism itself has much internal diversity (Mozaffari, 2007: 24), as does the wider religion that Qutb claims to be monolithic.
A Monopoly on Truth and History
Islamism`s claim to represent the ‘authentic voice’ for Muslims is therefore unfounded, with Islam itself containing much internal diversity. A major success of Islamism, however, has been to convince many Muslims and non-Muslims of its own authority in this regard. This has been done in a number of ways, the major of which being the propagation of a flawed view of Islamic history. This links to what William Montgomery Watt has labelled the ‘traditional self-image’ of Islam, which arose between 950-1200 AD (Watt, 1988: 2). Simply put, this image conceives of Islam as a perfect set of values and ideas, representing all that is needed for human life. Central to this is the concept of ‘unchangingness’, the idea that human nature is static, and that the same essential laws for governing mankind hold true throughout time (Watt, 1988: 4). Islam, as the ‘final religion’, provides the complete set of these laws, rendering social progress and reform unthinkable. In order to maintain this image of infallibility however, the history of the religion has often been altered. For instance, accounts of torture and assassination in Islamic history are frequently omitted from school curricula in the Muslim World, with a general image of benevolence and mercy being propagated instead (AbuKhalil, 1994: 682). This image has further been protected through the marginalization of any who question the ‘facts’ of this history, an act which has become conflated with challenging the legitimacy of Islam itself (AbuKhalil, 1994: 680).
Through such processes the traditional self-image of Islam has come to dominate all others, despite representing a limited perspective on the faith. It is through these mechanisms that a ‘false unity’ has therefore been constructed, whereby the true diversity of the religion has been suppressed through coercion. This is not the coercion of a single central authority however, but instead seems to have emerged from an ancient culture within Islamic thought that values unity and tradition above diversity and progress. According to Watt, such traditionalism traces back to the nomadic tribes of the Arabian desert, and their belief that following in the footsteps of their ancestors was the best means to achieve survival (Watt, 1988: 6). This historical context may also explain why ‘social unity’ is a core value within Islam. In response to the harsh Hobbesian landscape of the Arabian desert, where life was often “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” (Hobbes, 1651: 97), many chose to unite into communities with powerful social bonds, which would then act as a bulwark against such a hostile environment. However, a strong tribe could only be achieved through a concrete sense of tribal identity, requiring a significant degree of homogeneity in both social practice and belief. This may have necessitated a collective intolerance of internal diversity, as any ideas and practices which weakened this shared sense of ‘self’ would have constituted a threat to the survival of the community.
This attitude seems to have persevered through the genesis of Islam and has become a powerful current within Islamic thought. Indeed, processes of majoritarian coercion similar to that outlined above have occurred throughout the Muslim World, with the widespread marginalization and punishment of dissenters. This intolerance of internal diversity has been matched also by a hostility towards foreign ideas. Many conservative Muslims view such outside influences as having a ‘weakening’ or ‘corrupting’ effect on Islamic life (Calvert, 2009: 227), arguing that only the values and ideas given by God can meet the requirements for human fulfillment. Many also develop a hostility towards reason on this basis, contending that the ideas of the Qur`an are true and self-sufficient, and so no more is needed to fulfill human needs (Paya, 2016: 386). An example of this can be found in the ‘Tafkiki School’, a modern Shi`i mode of thought which is staunchly anti-rationalist. The main tenet of this School is that the Divine Message bestowed by God has been distorted over time, due to its mixing with other forms of mystical and philosophical teachings (Paya, 2016: 393). Man-made reason and foreign ideas are seen to have compromised the integrity of modern Islam. Proponents therefore reject contemporary acts of interpreting the faith through reason (Paya, 2016: 395).
Such anti-rationalism displayed in the Tafkiki School has its roots in Islamic history also, as well as certain Qur`anic teachings which discourage the study of other religions (Watt, 1988: 31). However, this attitude is not essential to Islamic thought, with other approaches to reason and foreign ideas also being present. For example, there is evidence that a degree of Aristotelian logic was studied and preserved in the Kalām discipline of Islam (Watt, 1988: 30), with Greek philosophy being an initial area of enthusiasm for early Muslim scholars. More positive accounts of reason have also existed in the faith, such as in the hadiths of the Prophet Muhammad: “heaven is made of one hundred ranks, ninety-nine of which are reserved for the people of reason and one for the rest” (AbuKhalil, 1994: 688). There are therefore competing trends within Islamic thought that must be parsed, some being dogmatic and isolationist with others being open and flexible. This means that, while Islamists have succeeded in drawing from the more insular aspects of their religion, this worldview does not embody the faith entirely and can be challenged from a position which can also claim to be ‘authentically’ Islamic.
The Islamist worldview is thus predicated upon a flawed interpretation of Islam, maintained through the coercive suppression of uncomfortable truths. The sanitized view held by many Muslims of their own history is used by Islamists to foster a yearning for an idealized past, embodied in the political model of the “ideal city-state of the Rashidun” (Etienne 1987, cited in Mozaffari, 2007: 20). This was the state presided over by the four ‘rightly-guided’ caliphs after the death of Muhammad and forms the blueprint for modern conceptions of the Islamic State. However, whilst ignorance of Islam`s history may contribute to Islamist support in the modern world, this is not sufficient to explain why the bulk of the ideologies base is made up by young, well-educated people (Woltering, 2010: 1136). Nor does it explain why many Muslims raised in the West, with the benefits of a Western education, become radicalized by international Islamist organizations (Angel, 2008: 13). This suggests that there may be deeper reasons why the Islamist narrative has achieved such widespread support.
Political Roots of Islamist Support
Some scholars have attempted to explain the widespread popularity of Islamism through a discussion of certain political factors which may have contributed to it. For example, Robbert Woltering has argued that the bulk of Islamist support is often drawn from developing, economically deprived post-colonial countries, where much animosity towards the West already exists. Young Muslims in these societies, who have grown up deeply dissatisfied with their current regimes, are drawn to Islamism due to it offering a rebellious, revolutionary alternative (Woltering, 2010: 1138). This is aided by the Islamist narrative drawing from deep currents of anti-Western attitudes in such societies, with power discrepancies between Western nations and their countries being a frequent source of insecurity and humiliation (Woltering, 2010: 1139). Woltering says that we therefore cannot dismiss the colonial legacy in creating this social milieu of political grievance and anti-Western feeling, and that these grievances play a key role in radicalization. Indeed, he contends that these grievances are the major motivators of Islamist support, with religious factors being largely negligible.
However, this analysis fails to answer why radicalization processes are not just occurring in post-colonial societies but have also extended to many Western nations. A study into radicalization in an East London borough may help to explain this. This study found that the rise in anti-Muslim bigotry after the 9/11 and 7/7 terrorist attacks in New York and London, has served to radicalize many Western Muslims who feel increasingly unwelcome in the countries that they live in (Angel, 2008: 16). The responses of Western governments to the jihadist threat may have contributed to this problem. Many still perceive George Bush`s policy of a ‘war on terror’ as a ‘war against Islam’ itself (Kundnani, 2014: 96), with this narrative of a clash of civilizations between Islam and the West being adopted on both sides of the conflict. It is possible that such tribalistic thinking has encouraged tribalistic behavior amongst many Muslims who now feel ‘under siege’. It is these discontented young people, feeling a profound sense of isolation from their societies, that are largely targeted by Islamist organizations for recruitment. One such organization, Hizb ut-Tahri (HT), is discussed in Angel`s study. Ed Husain, a former HT member and current reformist Muslim, writes that this organization`s major function in the UK has been to channel the anger of these younger generations, harnessing the discontent raised by issues like the war in Iraq and the limited economic opportunities available to them (Angel, 2008: 15).
Hizb ut-Tahrir is a Sunni Islamist organization founded by Taqiuddin al-Nabhani in 1953, which has proven hugely influential at spreading the Islamist goal to Muslim minorities across Europe. Exploiting the economic disadvantage, low social position and racial prejudices faced by many young Muslims in the Islamic diaspora, HT has succeeded in promoting an ideological narrative of Islam under siege by a hostile West (Hamid, 2007: 151). This is further corroborated by Maajid Nawaz, a friend of Ed Husain who is also a former HT member turned liberal reformer. In his book Radical, Nawaz discusses how similar forces led to his own radicalization, with “grievances, identity crises, charismatic recruiters and compelling narratives” (Nawaz, 2012: 100) being instrumental in the process of ideological indoctrination. These conditions are utilized effectively by organizations like HT, who promote a ‘separatist agenda’ which discourages integration of Muslim communities into larger society. Nawaz argues that this agenda then becomes self-fulfilling, with more racism and discrimination arising in response, leading to further support for the Islamist cause (Nawaz, 2012: 327).
Hence, a vicious cycle occurs, whereby division and violence on both sides contributes to a ‘clash of civilizations’ narrative which pits the whole of the West against all of Islam. This notion of a fundamental dichotomy between Western and Islamic civilization is promoted by Islamist ideologues (Hamid, 2007: 147) and is further solidified through acts of bigotry and violence by far-right reactionaries. It is here that Samuel Huntington`s thesis manifests itself in troubling ways, becoming a powerful lens through which actors on both sides view the current conflict (Bottici and Challand, 2006: 322). This framework draws from a similar ‘enlarged tribal consciousness’ identified by Hannah Arendt in Pan-Movements, rooted in over-simplified images of the ‘Other’ and ‘Self’ (Bottici and Challand, 2006: 327). Political reactionaries may therefore be playing into Islamism`s hands when they act in ways which perpetuate this myth, either through divisive state policies, or through actions which serve to demonize all Muslims. This was the concern of Robbert Woltering when he sought to deny any links between the religion of Islam and the Islamist ideology.
Religious Roots of Islamist Support
Woltering argues that Islam is not inherent in any way to Islamism, rejecting the idea that the ideology may have religious roots. He contends that such a notion merely plays into Islamism`s hands, by substantiating its claim of representing the ‘authentic voice’ of the religion (Woltering, 2010: 1136). However, while this concern is legitimate, such a failure to contend with potential religious and cultural causes of the phenomenon could lead to an incomplete analysis. For instance, in taking a purely political perspective, it becomes difficult to explain the past actions of many Islamists, such as suicide bombing. Whilst violent uprisings could be explained as a product of political grievance and socioeconomic desperation, it is more difficult to extend this to the tactic of suicide bombing amongst jihadists without reference to religious concepts like ‘martyrdom’ and ‘jihad’ (Oliver and Steinberg, 2006: 74). If Islamists were solely driven by the desire to improve their social conditions, then it is difficult to see how such acts of self-destruction could be justified. However, the notion of heavenly reward for those who die fighting in battle may be a decisive factor in motivating such acts (Bonner, 2008: 72). To deny any link between these ideas and the practice of suicide bombing may therefore hamper a true understanding of the problem.
This means that there is a need to discuss the role of religious factors in the ideology in a way which does not lapse into essentializing Islam itself, which is when certain beliefs or behaviors are erroneously considered universal features of the faith. This must involve an acknowledgement that Islam is a diverse religion with a complex history, and that the meanings of religious ideas differ between Muslims and change over time. For example, the concept of jihad has not always had the same aggressive connotations as it does in Islamist rhetoric. William Montgomery Watt has argued that jihad originally denoted striving for the survival of the tribe, playing a largely defensive role against potential oppressors (Watt, 1976: 144-145). Similarly, many historical Islamic thinkers associated the concept of martyrdom with those who succeed in overcoming their base desires in the struggle against the self, with a ‘spiritual death’ taking precedence over a physical one (Bonner, 2008: 78-79). The fact that these ideas have had multifarious meanings in Islamic history should warn us against exaggerating their link with the practices of jihadists. Other factors are clearly at play in motivating the behavior of Islamists, such as the political and economic forces outlined above. Nevertheless, to argue that religious ideas are inert in the Islamist ideology may be to lapse into another extreme.
Indeed, it may be that Islamism has proven so popular amongst many young Muslims due to its ability to exploit these pre-existing religious concepts. This is most clear in the transformation of jihad by violent Islamists into an “instrument of terror” (Tibi, 2012: 139), whereby practices like suicide bombings are interpreted as divinely ordained acts. For jihadists, their struggle embodies a just war of the oppressed versus the oppressors, with those willing to kill and die for the cause being labelled as ‘holy warriors’ (Tibi, 2012: 142). They perceive Islam as a subjugated culture which must defend itself against the outside world, a framework which draws from an ancient dichotomy between the ‘sphere of Islam’ the ‘sphere of war’ in Islamic thought (Watt, 1976: 152). With the outside world being portrayed as a continuous threat to the ‘tribe’ of Islam, jihadists have therefore justified their atrocities by warping the traditional meaning of jihad as a defensive mechanism. Through perpetuating this narrative of cultural oppression, and by expanding the scope of the Self-Other boundary so that it encompasses entire civilizations, they have rationalized extending the front-line of their war to the streets of all foreign cities, with any civilian population as their target.
Thus, in drawing from ancient currents within Islamic thought, modern ideologues have succeeded in presenting their movement as authentically ‘Muslim’ in character. This practice of “self-essentializing” (Angel, 2008: 14) serves a vital function in garnering legitimacy for the cause and is partly predicated upon the conservative monopoly held over truth and history in the Muslim World. Upon the flawed conception of Islamic history that this produces, Islamists have constructed a narrow theological perspective which many now believe constitutes the one true interpretation of the faith. This can be rejected as blind to Islam`s true scope and diversity, however we should not fall into the same trap as Woltering in denying that it has no roots in the religion. To do so may mean sacrificing a proper understanding of Islamism, and thus compromise the ability of political actors to effectively respond to the problem. Therefore, what is needed is a re-evaluation of Islamic thought and history which identifies those aspects of the faith which have contributed to the emergence of Islamism. This should be done without either condemning the religion as the sole cause of the ideology, or fully exonerating it as merely a cosmetic feature of a purely political movement.
Chapter Three: A New Face of Islam?
This chapter will explore the possibilities of effectively responding to Islamism, both for policymakers in the West and for those in the Muslim World seeking to enact social change. This will involve a discussion of liberal Muslim reformists such as Maajid Nawaz, Ed Husain and Ayaan Hirsi Ali, actors who are seeking a reformation within contemporary Islamic civilization. This will dovetail into a discussion of the importance of generating a ‘democratic culture’ within Islam as a counter-narrative to Islamism, referencing how democratization projects have fared in the past, and what barriers may exist for them in the future. The role of Western states in combating Islamism will also be discussed, and recommendations for how this should be undertaken will be outlined. The chapter will conclude that the West`s proper function should be to act as a facilitator for reform in the Muslim World, by providing a safe haven for reformist Muslims to express their views. Performing this role may prove a vital component in an eventual reformation within Islam, whereby the more progressive aspects of the faith would be brought to the fore at the expense of its more illiberal trends.
An Islamic Reformation?
A sensible place to start in seeking ways to address the problem of Islamism would be to explore the works of liberal Muslim reformists such as Ed Husain, Maajid Nawaz and Ayaan Hirsi-Ali. These thinkers have a range of different views on how such a task should be undertaken, but all converge on the goal of trying to stoke liberal and democratic reform within the Muslim World. Hirsi-Ali for instance, in her book Heretic, advocates the need for a complete ‘Islamic Reformation’ whereby a different set of values would be emphasized at the expense of the faith`s more regressive elements (Hirsi-Ali, 2015: 235). She bases her approach to this task on a distinction between ‘Medina’ and ‘Mecca’ Muslims, the former being those who harbor a fundamentalist worldview originating in the warlike Medina period in the life of the Prophet Muhammad, and the latter being characterized by the more peaceful and inclusive example set by his earlier years in Mecca (Hirsi-Ali, 2015: 14-15). Hirsi-Ali speaks of the need to challenge the mindset of Medina Muslims and to open the faith up to greater diversity of opinion. She contends that this can only be done through a campaign which embraces the “world-changing power” of blasphemy (Hirsi-Ali, 2015: 234), as this would constitute a direct challenge to the cultural monopoly held by conservative voices in the Muslim World.
This project shares many similarities with that of Maajid Nawaz and Ed Husain, both of whom aim to introduce a respect for human rights, pluralism and democracy into their faith. This aspiration is based on a similar premise as Hirsi-Ali`s: that the current domination of conservative voices in Islamic culture is not an inevitable state of affairs. In The Islamist, Husain argues that Islamism and ‘Wahhabism’, a conservative and puritanical sect within Islam, both represent deeply narrow interpretations of the religion, which designate only a select few Islamic sources as the ‘literal truth’ (Husain, 2007: 235). Such literal interpretations sacrifice much of the nuance in Islamic scripture, with “metaphors, allegories, love and transcendence” (Husain, 2007: 234) losing all meaning. Nawaz and Husain agree that this mindset must be combated as part of an enduring counter-narrative against Islamism, driven by a grassroots movement of young, liberal Muslim reformers who can work to show their communities another face of their faith (Nawaz, 2012: 320). In doing so, the cultural monopoly held by fundamentalists can be broken, and the yearning for a ‘one true’ meaning of Islam can be replaced by a respect for pluralism and diversity of interpretation.
The message championed by these thinkers is therefore that Islam is not an inherently regressive or violent religion, but rather is complex and multifarious in meaning. Indeed, a major crime of Islamism has been to deny this internal diversity, constructing a false social unity upon a narrow interpretation of the faith. This links to a similar tendency in all totalitarian ideologies, whereby overt coercion is wielded in order to reduce the official texts of a belief system to a state of “one-meaningness” (Plamper, 2001: 526). This is where the ambiguity of such ideas is extinguished, with a single interpretation being exalted as the only legitimate approach for all true believers. In Islamist discourse this tendency is present when its proponents assert that the Qur`an offers one easily discernible model for how humans should conduct their affairs. In reality however, Qur’anic writings are far more ambiguous, even being described by Ali ibn Abi Talib, son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, as “hammalu awjuh” (AbuKhalil, 1994: 679), meaning multi-faceted and subject to interpretation. The denial of this has been a denial of the true nature of Islam, harming external perceptions of the faith, and acting as a significant obstacle to social progress.
Prospects for Democratization
A likely place that many Muslim reformists would start at in such an Islamic Reformation concerns the minimal amount of functional democracies in the Muslim World, with prospects for democratization being the most concrete shape that Islamic reform could take in the immediate future. Indeed, many hoped widespread democratization would be the outcome of the Arab Spring in 2010, a series of anti-government protests arising in the wake of the Tunisian Revolution, whereby uprisings against autocratic regimes in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain occurred. The causes of this movement are manifold, resulting from a combination of corrupt governments, aging leaders, poor economic conditions, and an educated population of unemployed young people (Anderson, 2011: 3). Despite the initial promise of this movement however, only Tunisia has now successfully transitioned into a full constitutional democracy, with all other countries lapsing back into an authoritarian status quo. This no doubt has been disheartening for many liberal observers. However, despite these disappointing returns, Tunisia`s success in becoming one of the only functional democracies in the Muslim World should give liberals some hope for extending this model to other countries. Indonesia, a Southeast Asian Muslim-majority country, is another potential model for this, owing to the significant progress it has made towards democratization (Hefner, 2000: 6).
However, many barriers still exist for such processes, the primary of which being the cultural attitudes of the countries in question. A key reason why a democratization project is likely to fail in a particular country is often due to it lacking a robust ‘democratic culture’ which the new system can be built upon. This refers to habits like public participation, acceptance of electoral defeat and tolerance of political differences being common amongst the citizenry (Hefner, 2000: 215). Countries with such values already established have a civil bedrock upon which the formal institutions of liberal democracy can rest. However, countries without this culture often struggle to maintain democratic institutions beyond merely a formal level. This often also leads to ‘electoralism’, whereby elections take place superficially, however the civic freedoms necessary for liberal democracy remain absent (Cammack, 1998: 252). This renders electoral regimes brittle, with the facade of democracy often giving way to authoritarianism. This suggests that we may face significant challenges in the Muslim World when the proliferation of democratic ideas meets resistance from both conservative and Islamist voices. However, despite many conservative Muslims being skeptical of reform as well, the major resistance to democratization will likely emerge from Islamism.
This is because Islamism is an inherently anti-democratic force, even in its institutional manifestations. This relates to the goal of all Islamists, which is to establish Islamic rule over society, either in the form of a national ‘Islamic State’, or a global system which would constitute ‘Pax Islamica’ (Tibi, 2012: 146). Such systems are only achievable, however, through the destruction of all institutions of secular government, including democratic procedures. This means that the Islamist cause is fundamentally incompatible with democracy, even when Islamists pursue their goal through electoral means (Tibi, 2008: 44). This also suggests that the popularity of Islamism poses a significant barrier to democratization, actively contradicting any potential movements to stoke a democratic culture within Muslim societies. There is therefore a need to struggle against Islamism in all of its forms, if democratization will be successful. However, political actors must be cautious about how this is done, as there are a range of costs to consider for each of the potential strategies that could be taken.
The Role of the West
Firstly, strategies which perpetuate a ‘clash of civilizations’ narrative should be avoided, as such methods risk transforming Huntington`s thesis into a counterproductive, self-fulfilling prophecy (Bottici and Challand, 2006: 329). This is an ever-present danger with any military response to Islamism, with the effectiveness of such measures often being questionable. However, humanitarian or international security concerns may justify Western intervention against jihadist groups in some cases. In these situations, however, all efforts should be taken to avoid a clash of civilizations framework in both political messaging and policy intent. Political actors should refrain from speaking or thinking in terms of ‘Islam versus the West’, and should also be cautious about acting in ways which give credibility to the Islamist narrative. Military campaigns which are likely to exacerbate animosity between Islam and the West should therefore only be undertaken when strictly necessary, and participants should be receptive as to how bad conduct in war may exacerbate the problem of radicalization. There is thus important strategic reasons to avoid civilian casualties in such campaigns at all costs, alongside the obvious moral case to be made here. Poorly executed military interventions can easily harm the reform process, and so their utility as a strategy to respond to Islamism is limited.
A far more promising method of addressing the issue would be the construction of a ‘counter-narrative’ against the ideology itself, supporting the cause of Islamic reformists through cultural mechanisms. This project of reform hinges on the challenge of persuading young Muslims to adopt a new set of social values, and open themselves up to new interpretations of their faith. To do this, a free exchange of ideas between Islamic and Western thinkers will be vital. Through such open discussion, many young Muslims could be emancipated from the trappings of the traditionalist monopoly currently enjoyed by Islamism, and discover a new face of Islam which has often been submerged. Thus, ‘blasphemy’ may be the most useful tool in the reformist arsenal (Hirsi-Ali, 2015: 234). Despite this largely representing an internal transformation within Islam, there may still be a significant role for the West to play in this process. With their often-robust institutions of freedom of speech, Western nations may be capable of facilitating change by allowing dissenters from the Muslim World a safe platform in which to platform their views. They would thus do better to marshal their social institutions and civic liberties in the struggle against Islamism, rather than their military might.
This suggests a vital need to maintain and preserve such civic freedoms regardless of the costs that may be incurred as a result from the actions of Islamist reactionaries. Indeed, certain developments may already be threatening such freedoms. One of these developments is the problematic discourse surrounding ‘Islamophobia’, an ambiguous term often leveled against critics of Islam. This is a problematic term for a number of reasons, not least of which is the fact that it propagates the distorted view that there is one Islam, constituting a homogeneous tribe against which such a phobia can exist (Halliday, 1999: 898).
Another major issue with this term relates to its ambiguity. There is no doubt that bigotry against Muslims is a growing problem across the world, as the recent atrocity in Christchurch, New Zealand brutally attests (Graham-McLay, 2019). However, the term ‘Islamophobia’ merely serves to equate such acts of genuine bigotry with legitimate criticisms of Islamic ideas, thus obfuscating the issue. The problem is that ‘Islam’ is not a people, but rather is a broad cultural tradition subscribed to by the Muslim community, containing many competing practices and beliefs. To equate the ideas of the former with the individuals of the latter is to remove the ability of thinkers to criticize Islam without suffering accusations of bigotry, as has occurred increasingly often in recent years. A clear case of this occurred in 2016 when the US-based Southern Poverty Law Centre (SPLC) included Maajid Nawaz in a list of ‘anti-Muslim extremists’ due to his record of criticizing Islam (Richardson, 2018). This judgment was made despite Nawaz being an anti-racist campaigner and a Muslim himself, and emerged largely due to the inherent flaws in the definition of Islamophobia. The SPLC later apologized and redacted this label, however the culture of equating Islam`s critics with outright bigots has continued.
In some cases, these accusations may result from a desire to silence dissenting opinions. However, many others likely emerge from the widespread confusion over what ‘Islamophobia’ actually means. The lack of a clear distinction between legitimate criticism and outright bigotry leads to a general culture of uncertainty about where the limits of frank discussion on this topic are, rendering controversial yet necessary debate increasingly costly for its participants. A new term is therefore needed which is more specific in its definition, thus making the delineation between criticism and bigotry possible. One example has been put forward by Fred Halliday, who advocates the use of the term “Anti-Muslimism” (Halliday, 1999: 898) as an alternative. Other possibilities include ‘Muslimophobia’ or ‘Anti-Muslim bigotry’, both of which succeed in clarifying the issue as one of intolerance against people, rather than an aversion to Islamic ideas. The adoption of one of these terms in lieu of ‘Islamophobia’ would also aid in preserving Western nations as safe havens for Muslim reformers, by reducing the likelihood that false accusations of racism will be leveled against them. Such an innovation may also accompany a general ethos for how debates on all contentious issues of this type should be handled: recognizing the need to address such topics clearly and forthrightly, without lapsing into outright hatred or tribalistic thinking. This attitude is concisely expressed by Maajid Nawaz, in his bold notion that “no idea is above scrutiny, and no people are beneath dignity” (Harris and Nawaz, 2015: 89).
Conclusion
In this essay I have aimed to extend public discourse on the problem of Islamism beyond mere discussions of the particular actions of jihadist groups, to the deeper and more complex dangers arising from the ideology`s aim. This has meant unpacking the major factors driving Islamism and looking for ways to effectively address it based on this analysis.
Firstly, I placed Islamism within the historical context of the Islamic Revival, a broad cultural movement which aims at the ‘re-Islamization’ of society. Chapter One concluded that the Islamic Revival, and its political vanguard, poses a range of challenges to social progress and liberal values that must be addressed. However, this struggle should not be considered a ‘clash of civilizations’, due to this framework being too fatalistic, and nor should the debate lapse into liberal utopianism. I therefore advocated for a ‘cautiously optimistic’ approach to the problem. I then unpacked the Islamist worldview in Chapter Two, exploring the range of factors which have contributed to its success. It was concluded that the ideology is both religious and political in nature and is predicated upon a flawed account of Islamic history. This point was expanded upon in Chapter Three, whereby I discussed liberal reformist Muslims who aim to expose the narrow interpretation of Islam that under-girds Islamism. This chapter then discussed possibilities for reform within Islamic civilization, and the potential role of the West in such a process. It was concluded that Western societies should marshal their social institutions in the struggle for an Islamic Reformation, maintaining themselves as ‘safe havens’ for Muslim reformers.
In my analysis of Islamism, it has therefore been concluded that the ideology represents a unique and multifaceted phenomenon which will require a nuanced response. Even if jihadism is successfully defeated worldwide, the problems posed by Islamism to human rights and social progress will still be left to address. A military response is therefore unlikely to remove the core motivating factors of this phenomenon. Western nations can however mitigate for some of these causes, by pursuing domestic and international policies which minimize the political and socioeconomic factors which contribute to radicalization. Nevertheless, the West is not primarily responsible for the emergence of Islamism, and the vital changes needed to address this issue can only take place within the Muslim World. The next generation of Muslims worldwide will therefore be vital in determining the future of Islam and its civilization. If the liberal message of pluralism, human rights and democracy can be successfully imparted to this group, then Islamism`s support will erode at its roots. This project has the potential to emphasize a new face of Islam, accentuating its forward-thinking aspects whilst alleviating its more regressive elements.
This essay has merely laid out the potential of such a reform project. It is therefore the task of future scholarship to negotiate the exact shape and scale of this proposed ‘Islamic Reformation’. This will require open discussion on the nature of Islam which refrains both from condemning it as a lost cause, or from exonerating it as merely a benign force in global politics. It may also be prudent for further research to focus on how Western nations can best prevent radicalization within their own borders. This may involve a greater focus on cultural integration in immigration policies, social programs which address socioeconomic grievances, or a more effective crackdown on the racial abuse experienced by many in the Islamic diaspora. The real change, however, must ultimately emerge from within Islamic civilization.
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