This essay will outline a proposal on how the case of children should be handled under a society which has fully established a ‘Universal Basic Income’. This is a topic which poses a unique problem for UBI, due to the fact that up until adulthood, children are often ill-equipped to make use of such fiscal endowments. Nevertheless, children are future adult citizens, and so to deny them UBI may be a failure to realize the ‘universality’ of the policy. The proposal presented here attempts to strike a balance between the duty of society to extend its welfare commitments to its infant population, and the necessity of withholding such endowments until they can be effectively exercised by rational adults. I therefore advocate combining UBI with another proposal: that of the ‘Stakeholder Society’, whereby all citizens reaching the age of adolescence receive a lump-sum cash endowment. It will be argued that a welfare system which combines these two proposals is superior to either one alone, combining their benefits whilst also mitigating some of their issues.
An Account of Children’s Rights
In making this proposal, it is first important to clarify the position on children`s rights which will be adopted. Historically, this topic has been dominated by the notion that parents are the ‘owners’ of their children`s interests until the age of adulthood. Such arguments justify a rigid form of paternalism which denies children any independence or responsibility of their own, due to them lacking a capacity for reason (Worsfold, 1974: 142). However, defenders of children`s rights have challenged these property-based approaches. Amy Gutman, for example, has criticized them for falsely equating a child’s interests with that of their parents, leading to an overbearing and rigid form of paternalism (Gutman, 1980: 342). Instead she poses an alternative, which makes the right of “paternalistic agency” (Gutman, 1980: 343) over children contingent on the fulfillment of certain duties. These duties are defined in relation to a set of objective interests, which the child is assumed to possess regardless of the judgments of their parents. This would mean that, while parents no longer have absolute control over the livelihoods of their offspring, space is left for the exercise of parental authority with the aim of pursuing the child’s interests. This form can be labelled as ‘necessary paternalism’.
This duty-based approach to children`s rights is a superior conception, as it allows for the empowerment of children even before the age of reason is reached. However, the capacity gap between adults and infants must also be recognized. While some may be tempted to pursue equal inter-generational freedom and the abolition of all forms of paternalism, this may have negative impacts on a child`s ability to exercise their “future freedoms” (Gutman, 1980: 338). Many would agree that before education, an individual is ill-equipped to exercise their own will effectively, or to have an accurate conception of his own interests. For instance, a child who refuses to attend school despite the best efforts of his parents to convince him of its benefits would be exercising his existing rights, yet this would limit his prospects for future autonomy. This argument is grounded on the ‘real will’ notion devised by John Rawls, which says that in the absence of reason as a means to comprehend one’s own interests, others are sometimes authorized to act on our behalf (Evers, 1978: 112). Reason is therefore not the criterion for having rights but is the capacity by which they can be effectively exercised, and it is the primary role of parents to act as ‘trustees’ of such rights by raising children into adults capable of utilizing them.
A New Proposal for UBI
The adoption of this duty-based approach to children`s rights has consequences for a potential UBI system. It suggests that, while children enjoy the same basic right to the endowment as adults, their inability to utilize it effectively may justify withholding access to the money until the ‘age of reason’ is reached. On this basis, I propose the collecting of all UBI payments owed to children up until the age of 18 into a common fund, which will then be provided as a lump-sum at the legal age of self-sufficiency. This withheld money would be labelled the ‘Future Fund’, to highlight its role as a mechanism of empowerment for young people to effectively exercise their newfound autonomy. After this lump-sum is provided, UBI payments would then proceed on a monthly basis for the rest of a citizen’s life. This proposal assumes the society in question would be one which has fully instituted a Universal Basic Income. By ‘fully instituted’, I mean here a society which has achieved the means (both political and material) to establish a level of UBI for all citizens which can “satisfy basic needs” (Van Parijs, 2004: 4).
I make this assumption on an understanding of the term ‘Basic’ in UBI as expressing the necessity that the stipend would constitute a “material foundation” (Van Parijs, 1997: 35) for life. In other words, UBI could not conceivably be considered fully realized if the level of endowment represented a fraction of the resources needed to live a modest existence. Subsistence-level UBI is the only form of the policy which would provide the means to remove oneself from the job market, hence giving citizens the “real freedom” (Van Parijs, 1997: 4) to choose their own paths in life. Similarly, due to the fact that the lump-sum ‘stake’ which I advocate for is drawn from an aggregate fund of UBI payments, the smaller such payments are, the smaller the eventual stake will be. This would mean the lump-sum when UBI is below subsistence-level may have negligible effects on the prospects of young people, thus diminishing its role as a mechanism of empowerment. Under a fully instituted UBI system however, the combination of a monthly stipend with a lump-sum in adolescence would offer many benefits. These can be understood through engaging with ideas related to ‘Stakeholder Society’ policies.
Originating in the works of Thomas Paine and further developed by Ackerman and Alstott, these theories suggest instituting a lump-sum payment at the age of adolescence, which would act as an “economic stake in the commonwealth” (Ackerman and Alstott 1999: 181). This was intended to secure a substantial link between society and the individual, who would feel a deeply personal debt to her fellow citizens. This relationship would be based on a foundation of goodwill between the people and their government, and usher in a strong sense of citizenship to act as a bulwark against inevitable future crises (Ackerman and Alstott, 1999: 186-187). The policy would also establish equality of opportunity for all young citizens and emphasize the importance of personal responsibility in adult life (Wright, 2006: 6). However, it is this predominant focus on personal responsibility which reveals the darker side of the policy, as those who fail to achieve economic self-sufficiency through their stake are given little chance for redemption.
Comparing and Combining the Two Policies
Such an attitude towards those who fail to build livelihoods through their endowment may be defensible on libertarian grounds, however this falls short of the potential of polices like UBI to achieve ‘real freedom’. A subsistence-level stipend would provide citizens with the possibility to abstain from the job market and pursue non-economic efforts and interests. Stuart White outlined this as an argument in defense of UBI by highlighting the utility of non-market work which nonetheless serves vital social purposes, such as care work, charity, engaging in politics etc (White, 2006: 7). However, under the Stakeholding policy, the pressure that the lack of any social safety net (beyond minimal welfare) places on individual choice would heavily discourage such noble efforts. The demands of ensuring one’s talents become ‘marketable’ in the immediate future would greatly limit avenues open to young people. Therefore, this attitude towards those who “fail the test of freedom” (Ackerman and Alstott, 1999: 196) may benefit economic engagement, but would have significant costs in other areas of society.
This libertarian perspective is also based on a flawed conception of justice. Some may contend that those who fail to capitalize on their stake have no one to blame but themselves, and thus justice dictates letting them live with the consequences. However, this neglects to recognize that failure doesn’t always result from ineptitude. Take the hypothetical example of Tom: a straight-A student, ambitious and entrepreneurial, who is deeply prudent about how he uses his money. Tom plans to attend business school and eventually launch his own company. However, before he is set to leave for college, his ageing mother falls ill. Her condition is rare, and the treatment she needs cannot be provided through current public health care schemes. She cannot work and needs full-time support, and Tom eventually spends all of his lump-sum on supporting them both. This leaves him penniless and without prospects through no fault of his own, with no meaningful opportunities to make use of his natural potential. This is a unique scenario, as in most cases failure results from a combination of bad luck and insufficient merit. However, the recognition that undeserved luck can play a substantial role in determining an individual’s fate should give us pause before adopting a hard-line libertarian attitude towards distributive justice.
This example also demonstrates the benefits of combining the two policies. If a UBI safety-net for both Tom and his mother had been in place, this would have guaranteed at least a minimal level of support throughout the illness. Even if Tom would still have had to spend his whole stake on his mother’s treatment, the existence of UBI would guarantee future opportunities for him to utilize his talents. Equally, if Tom had been living under a UBI-only regime, he may not have had the money to pursue an expensive degree in the first place, as this would only guarantee subsistence-living. This may have meant relying on his family`s existing wealth to pay for his education, as in our current system whereby a young person`s inheritance largely governs his life prospects (Planel, 2018: 5). This may have made the family’s financial situation even more precarious during the illness. Some may object to this reasoning on the basis that Tom had the opportunity to privately save up his UBI during childhood, and so is responsible for whether he can afford his degree. However, this assumes his ability to act as a rational agent from birth, an idea which is problematized in my account of necessary paternalism. Tom`s incapacity to effectively exercise reason and understand his own long-term interests as a child suggests that his money may be best stored away in the Future Fund, until he can draw from it as a rational agent.
These policies are also better together due to them simultaneously performing two different functions. Whilst UBI guarantees protection for citizens against poverty and exploitation, providing a lump-sum as well constitutes an active gesture of trust by society in the individual. This money, given at the stage of life when possibilities for the future are first being explored, would empower young people to pursue whatever avenues they may desire. It is true that the existence of a UBI safety-net may weaken the relationship between personal responsibility and the lump-sum (Wright, 2006: 7). However, the fact that the endowment is a one-time occurrence, to be capitalized upon or wasted at the receiver’s behest, at least guarantees that personal responsibility does not disappear entirely. It may also be prudent to emphasize responsibility as a cultural value through educational mechanisms. An example of such a mechanism was proposed by Niels Planel, who argued that an agency which would offer advice to young people on how to spend their stake should be established accompanying such a ‘Universal Endowment’ (Planel, 2018: 10). Combining the efforts of this agency with that of compulsory education, the importance of using the stake responsibly should be emphasized clearly, and much guidance should be offered on the many ways it could be utilized. This would mean an equitable starting point in adult life for all young people, both financially and in terms of practical knowledge.
In offering UBI and a lump-sum within the same model, my proposal would also succeed in realizing Van Parijs` goal of real freedom in a broader sense: with ‘freedom from poverty’ and ‘freedom to pursue ambition’ embodying both the negative and positive strands of liberty outlined by Isaiah Berlin (1958: 159). While childhood would be governed largely by positive liberty and necessary paternalism, the providing of the lump-sum would symbolize a ‘handover point’, whereby full individual autonomy is realized. After this, the only economic freedom denied to citizens would be the freedom to lapse into poverty. Given the fact that the UBI safety-net would provide the means to start again in life, with no conditions attached, then it can be justified as ultimately providing more ‘real freedom’ than it would ever deny.
Possible Objections
There are however many possible objections to my proposal, which I will now attempt to address. One of these relates to the ‘Exploitation Objection’ often leveled against UBI. This contends that the system is vulnerable to those citizens who unreasonably burden society, by drawing resources from the “social pot” (White, 2006: 2) and rarely putting anything back in. This is the ‘Malibu surfer’ example discussed by Van Parijs (1997: 96), whereby a lazy citizen exploits the system to fund his idle lifestyle. Some have responded by arguing that the monthly endowment should be made conditional on recipients having a demonstrable ‘willingness to work’ (White, 2006: 13). Presumably this would be extended to my lump-sum, introducing the requirement that the stake must only be spent on endeavors which are deemed worthwhile by the state. There are two issues with this approach: firstly, it sends a mixed message in relation to what the lump-sum represents, it supposedly being a show of trust by society in the individual. Secondly, the ‘willingness to work’ criterion is too rigid, in that it rules out non-market work such as caring for family members, or artistic activities (such as painting or writing) which society may judge to be mere hobbies. Thus, it may be necessary to accept the risk of a lazy minority, in order to protect the freedom of the majority offered under an unconditional welfare system.
Another objection that may emerge relates to my argument concerning the role of luck in determining success/failure. An objector might say this argument is internally inconsistent, due to cases of ‘undeserved success’. If society mitigates against bad luck through a safety-net, should it also impose limits on those who have succeeded through extraordinary good luck, rather than inherent merit? The issue with such arguments is that the exact relationship between merit and luck is often unclear. Just as a safety-net can be justified on the basis that choice and fate are inseparable in most instances of failure, then a similar attitude can be taken to cases of success. In the absence of clear knowledge about how influential luck is in determining failure, then the basic protections of UBI are instigated. Similarly, in cases of great success, minimal appropriations of wealth occur in the form of taxation. However, any re-distributive mechanisms beyond this which push for greater equality of outcome may risk penalizing those who succeed through genuine merit and hard work.
This argument may provide a basis for advocating a larger wealth tax under my proposal. However, so long as enough tax is collected generally to fund the UBI-Stake system, then the requirements needed to mitigate for luck have been satisfied. This leads to another objection to my argument: that it fails to answer how this system would be funded. However, as this proposal merely adapts the existing model of subsistence-level UBI in a way that would cost no more than the original, resolving the issue of funding is not within the remit of this essay.
A final potential objection to my argument accompanies an alternative proposal: that childhood UBI payments should be given to parents instead of being held by the state, who can invest the money in their children. However, this argument fails to recognize that parents may not always use the money in the best interests of the child. This may result from conscious exploitation by the parents, or through their failure to fully comprehend a child`s long-term interests. Storing the money in a state-maintained ‘Future Fund’ however, would protect children against the irresponsibility or greed of bad parents. This alternative is also based on the outdated ‘ownership’ conception of parental rights. Under the duty-based account I advocate, the primary role of parents is to raise children into adults capable of enacting their own wills effectively. In other words, they are the ‘trustees’ of their children’s rights, not the ‘owners’. By allowing parents complete control over their children`s money in childhood, the right to fiscal autonomy at the age of reason is denied, violating the prescribed limits of necessary paternalism.
Conclusion
This essay has advocated for a system which combines UBI and Stakeholder policies, in order to realize the benefits of both simultaneously. This would be done by gathering all UBI payments owed throughout childhood into a ‘Future Fund’, which would then be administered as a lump-sum to young people upon reaching the age of 18. I have contended that this is the best way to achieve the goal of ‘real freedom’, a value which is common to literature on both policies. It also offers many other potential benefits to society. Under my proposal, children would have a sphere of unimpeachable rights protected by the state, whilst also receiving the necessary parental guidance and discipline needed to develop into well-balanced, autonomous adults. The dual functioning of the UBI safety-net and the positive empowerment of the ‘stake’ would provide the most equitable possible springboard into adult life. It would allow citizens the means to pursue their ambitions without poverty limiting their choices or the fear of poverty discouraging important, yet less marketable, endeavors.
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